伏 虎

信息管理与工程学院长聘副教授，博士生导师，滴水湖高级金融学院双聘教授，“国家级人才项目”青年学者，上海东方学者特聘教授。

2013年获美国康奈尔大学博士学位，博士后先后工作于微软研究院新英格兰实验室和加州理工学院，2016至2020年在加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学(UBC)计算机系任助理教授，曾任算法博弈论领域加拿大研究会主席(Canada Research Chair)，曾主持加拿大自然科学基金项目。多篇研究成果发表在Operations Research、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior等权威期刊和STOC、FOCS、SODA、EC等计算机顶级会议。多次担任STOC、SODA、EC等国际会议的程序委员会委员，国际会议WINE程序委员会主席等，曾任ACMSI Gecom Exchanges主编、EC工作坊主席。

经济学中的算法问题、在线算法等。

1. Pandora Box Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection: Hardness and Approximation Scheme. Hu Fu, Jiawei Li, Daogao Liu

2. Stability of Decentralized Queueing Networks: Beyond Complete Bipartite Cases.Hu Fu, Qun Hu, Jia'nan Lin

3. Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets.John Pang , Weixuan Lin , Hu Fu, Jack Kleeman, Eilyan Bitar, Adam Wierman

4. Oblivious Online Contention Resolution Schemes.Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Abner Turkieltaub, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang

5. Random Order Vertex Arrival Contention Resolution Schemes For Matching, With Applications.Hu Fu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu and Qianfan Zhang

6. Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions.Hu Fu and Tao Lin
Exponential Convergence of Gradient Methods in Concave Network Zero-sum Games.Amit Kadan and Hu Fu

7. Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms.Yang Cai, Federico Echenique, Hu Fu, Katrina Ligett, Adam Wierman and Juba Ziani

8. Report Sensitive Spot-Checking in Peer-Grading Systems.Hedayat Zarkoob, Hu Fu and Kevin Leyton-Brown

9. Limitations of Incentive Compatibility on Discrete Type Spaces.Taylor Lundy and Hu Fu

10. The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue.Hu Fu, Chris Liaw and Sikander Randhawa

11. Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization.Taylor Lundy, Alexander Wei, Hu Fu, Scott Duke Kominers and Kevin Leyton-Brown

12. The Value of Information Concealment.Hu Fu, Chris Liaw, Pinyan Lu and Zhihao Gavin Tang

13. The Efficiency of Open Access in Platforms for Networked Cournot Markets.John Pang, Hu Fu, Won Lee and Adam Wierman

14. Stability and Auctions in Labor Markets with Job Security.Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi and Rann Smorodinsky.Economic Letters154 (2017), 55-58.

15. Job Security, Stability and Production Efficiency.Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi and Rann Smorodinsky.Theoretical Economics12:1 (2017), 1-24.

16. Randomization Beats Second-Price as a Prior-Independent Auction.Hu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier and Philipp Strack

17. On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions.Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg

18. Improved Lower Bounds for Testing Triangle-Freeness in Boolean Functions via Fast Matrix Multiplication.Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg.

19. Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings.Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu and Anna Karlin

20. Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling.Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline and Robert Kleinberg.Journal version appeared asFull Surplus Extraction From SamplesinJournal of Economic Theory, 2021.

21. The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions.Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline

22. Prior-Independent Auctions for Risk-Averse Agents.Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy

23. Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design.Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balu Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis

24. Simultaneous Auctions Are (Almost) Efficient.Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier.Journal version appeared asSimultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficientinGames and Economic Behavior, 2020.

25. Ad Auctions with Data.Hu Fu, Patrick Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and Sergei Vassilvitskii

26. Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction.Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian.Journal version appeared asEfficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced FormsinMathematics of Operations Research, 2019.

27. Conditional Equilibrium Outcomes via Ascending Price Processes with Applications to Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding.Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg and Ron Lavi

28. Sketching Valuation Functions.Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, and Tim Roughgarden

29. Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy.Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg.Journal version appeared asApproximately Optimal Auctions for Correlated BiddersinGames and Economic Behavior, 2013.

30. Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.Dave Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer, and Chris Umans.

31. Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms.Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg.
Truthfulness via Proxies.Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg.